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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Defendant-Appellant did not agree to the child 
support order or waive his right to contest the child support order 
s contended by the Respondent. 
2. There is no clear uncontroverted evidence capable of 
supporting the arbitrarily low child support amount in light of the 
fact that the court did not enter Findings which support the child 
support amount. 
3. A party who chooses to appear Pro Se, should be held to 
the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member 
of the Bar. 
4. The Respondent has failed to show any legal basis for the 
court order requiring the child support to be paid into a trust 
account. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DID NOT AGREE TO THE 
CHILD SUPPORT ORDER OR WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO 
CONTEST THE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER. 
The Respondent misquotes the record in this case by contending 
that Mr. Allred approved of the Court's award of $100.00 per month 
in child support payments. At page 9 of the Brief, the Respondent 
has quoted out of context from the Transcript of the December 21, 
1988, hearing, claiming that Mr. Allred "agree" with the token 
amount of support. 
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A review of that hearing and the full transcript will reflect 
that Mr. Allred consistently contended that child support should 
be applied based upon the guide lines and never stipulated or 
agreed that the child support should be $100.00 per month. The 
record states that after both parties had made their arguments, 
the Court indicated its ruling, commencing at page 33 of the 
Transcript. The discussion then moved on to the off-sets which 
would be made because of prior orders and judgments and credits in 
relation to support for other children. Mr. and Mrs. Allred 
discussed with the judge as to when the child support of $100.00 
a month should commence in light of those credits. When Mr. Allred 
made the statement "perfect" (Transcript, page 36, line 12) he was 
referring to the court's order to take account for the credits and 
not the level of $100.00 a month as child support. 
The legal argument made by the Respondent that the Appellant 
agreed in some manner with the trial court is not supported by the 
record. The reliance of one word taken out of context by the 
Responden evidences the lack of a legal or factual basis to support 
the order of the trial court. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO CLEAR INCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE 
CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE ARBITRARILY LOW 
CHILD SUPPORT AMOUNT. 
The decision of Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461 (Utah Appeals, 
1989) requires the court to make sufficient findings of fact to 
support an award of child support. As set forth in the Brief of 
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the Appellant, the Findings of Fact in this case do not support the 
minimal child support of $100•00. Instead, the findings indicated 
that the Court abused its discretionary powers in setting the 
amount of support. With proper findings, this court could defer 
to the trial court's setting of the level of child support lower 
than the guide line amount. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 
(Utah App. 1988). However, there is not findings which support the 
amount set by the court in this matter and in light of the lack of 
those findings, this court should find that the trial court abused 
its discretion in disregarding the child support guide lines and 
other evidence presented at the trial. 
In the recent case of Jense v. Jense, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 
(Ct. App. 1989), the court held that the clear weight of the 
evidence was against the findings and order of the trial court. 
The court stated that an order modifying a decree will be 
overturned if the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings or the court abused its discretion citing Thompson v. 
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985). The order in this case is not 
even supported by sufficient findings and should be overturned as 
a clear abuse of discretion. 
The trial court had clear instructions from past legal 
precedent to enter sufficient findings of fact detailing the basis 
for the award. Since those findings of fact and conclusions were 
never entered, this court should determine that the amount of child 
support constituted an abuse of discretion and should reverse the 
order for an entry an amount of child support consistent with 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
POINT III. 
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, A PARTY WHO CHOSE TO 
REPRESENT HERSELF, SHOULD BE HELD TO THE SAME 
STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE AS ANY 
QUALIFIED MEMBER OF THE BAR. 
The Respondent contends that the procedural defects which took 
place in this case should be ignored because the Respondent was a 
layman acting as her own attorney. The Supreme Court in the case 
of Nelson v. Jacobsen, 69 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), cited by the 
respondent, clearly states that a lay person, if they elect to 
proceed as their own attorney, will be held to the same standard 
of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the Bar. That 
decisions indicates that the court should allow to lay persons 
without technical knowledge consideration in the presentation of 
the case. However, the Nelson v. Jacobsen case states that 
reasonable consideration does not require the court to explain 
legal rules or otherwise attempt to redress the ongoing 
consequences of the party's decision to function in the capacity 
for which he was not trained. 
In this case the Respondent attempted to use the procedural 
vehicle of an untimely objection to findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to modify a previous order of the court. The 
cases throughout the United States are consistent that a litigant 
who presents his own case and acts as his own attorney is bound by 
the same rules in relation to procedure and orders as members of 
the Bar. Loomis v. Seelv, 677 P.2d 400 (Colo. App. 1983) State 
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v, Harrold, 750 P.2d 959 (Id. App. 1988) and Newsome v. Farer, 708 
P.2d 327 (N.M. 1985) 
The exhibits which the Respondent has attached to her brief 
support the rule requiring Pro Se litigants to follow the rules of 
procedure. The Respondent bombarded the court with hand written 
letters not in correct procedural form and containing irrelevant 
information intended only to prejudice the court against the 
Defendant-Appellant* The Respondent is asking this court to rule 
that Pro Se litigants may ignore the Code of Judicial 
Administration, the Rules of Civil Procedure, and write ex parte, 
irrelevant letters to the court. Granting such a drastic privilege 
to persons who act as their own attorneys, will create two sets of 
procedural rules, one for attorneys, another for Pro Se litigants. 
POINT IV. 
THE RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY LEGAL 
BASIS FOR WHICH THE COURT ORDER REQUIRING THE 
CHILD SUPPORT TO BE PAID INTO A TRUST ACCOUNT 
CAN BE BASED. 
As acknowledged by the Respondent, the court clearly stated 
on the record at the December 21st hearing that the $100.00 per 
month child support was to be required for Cory only until Cory 
reached his 18th birthday. (See page 9 of the Respondent's 
Transcript). However, in an attempt to justify the unique ruling 
to pay child support into trust and not to be used for the 
immediate needs of the child, the Respondent has been forced to 
argue that this order can be supported by this court finding that 
the court intended that the child support be paid past age 18. (See 
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page 20 of Respondent's Brief). The Respondent's theory to support 
the ruling is inconsistent with the statements of the Court from 
the bench. 
The Respondent fails to describe any statute or rule which 
allows the court to create an estate for the child's benefit and 
to disallow child support to the custodial parent. There is not 
basis under law to justify the trial court's untimely granting of 
the Respondent's "request" to avoid child support payments and 
create a trust as the recipient of the child support. 
CONCLUSION OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Trial court did not enter adequate findings justifying 
either the Order setting the support or the order transferring the 
support to the adult child by means of the trust. The Court also 
lacked jurisdiction and did not have any available procedure to 
amend the order on the basis of the Plaintiff's untimely "request". 
Therefore, this court should reverse the order entered May 5, 
1989, which finally adopted the amendment made by interlineation 
at the hearing made on March 10, 1989, allowing the payment of 
child support into a trust fund and setting child support at 
$100.00 per month. The Court should then remand the matter to the 
trial Court to enter child support consistent with the child 
support guidelines. This Court should instruct the lower court not 
to permit diversion of the child support to a trust fund rather 
than paying the support directly to the appellant for current 
support of the minor child. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
Counsel of the Defendant-Appellant hereby certifies that four 
copies of this brief were served upon the Counsel for the 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Vicki Rinne by mailing the copies to the 
address on file with the Court of 9963 North Meadow Lane, Highland, 
Utah 84003 on this day of January, 1990. 
DATED this day of January, 1990. 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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